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E v e ry adult American has undoubtedly heard cries of alarm that the
Social Security system is poised on the brink of a financial crisis precipi-
tated in large part by the swelling numbers of retirees relative to workers.
The alarm has produced an outpouring of proposals for rescuing the sys-
tem—public investment in the stock market, privatization, government-
subsidized savings plans, “saving” general budget surpluses for Social
Security, raising the retirement age, cutting benefits, and some combina-
tion of these and other ideas. In this brief, Senior Scholar L. Randall
Wray and I ask whether there really is an impending financial crisis and,
more important, whether our ability to provide for retirees throughout
the twenty-first century depends on factors other than the financial sta-
tus of the Social Security Trust Funds. It is not until we establish the
nature of the problems we may face that we can evaluate existing pro-
posals realistically and begin to develop effective courses of action.
Our inquiry begins with an examination of the assumptions made by the
t rustees of the Trust Funds that led to their conclusion about the sys-
t e m ’s future financial insolvency. We show that their assumptions are
unduly pessimistic and that only a small change in any of the assump-
tions averts, or considerably reduces, the shortfall in funds. Even if we
accept their assumptions, the gap between Social Security revenues and
expenditures is projected to rise to just over 2 percent of GDP by 2075.
A financial crisis would thus be resolved by a 2 percent increase in the
percentage of GDP devoted to Social Security, and such shifts have been
made in the past without generating an economic emergency.
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The real issue re g a rding Social Security is not the size of the system’s
Trust Funds, but the size and distribution of the whole economic pie,
that is, the ability of future workers to produce enough goods and ser-
vices to provide an acceptable standard of living both for themselves and
for retirees. When the issue is viewed in this light, it becomes clear that
none of the popular reforms advocated thus far addresses the real prob-
lem of providing for future retirees. We present policy recommendations
that we believe are consistent with the true nature and scope of the
future problem. Our arguments suggest that baby boomers need not be
alarmed about Social Security financing; there are plenty of funds avail-
able or readily attainable for their retirement. However, it is important
to give thought to long-range issues beyond Social Security; it is through
actions taken now to ensure the growth of the economy that we can
ensure security for all retirees throughout the century.
I hope that you find the arguments made in this brief of interest and I
look forward to hearing your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
August 1999Public Policy Brief a6
“Saving” Social Security was perhaps the most important issue addressed
by President Clinton in his 1999 State of the Union Address. The presi-
dent and Congress seem to agree that projected budget surpluses should
be dedicated to saving Social Security before other uses are considered.
While not all observers approve of the specifics of the president’s plan,
there is widespread agreement that he is on the right track. 
In this brief, we first examine the view that the Social Security program
faces a crisis in the years to come, arguing that the assumptions used by
the Social Security Trustees are far too pessimistic. We understand the
natural inclination to be conservative when making projections over
p e r i ods as long as 75 years, but relatively minor adjustments to the
assumptions lead to very different assessments of Social Security’s long-
t e rm financial soundness. One must be careful about proposing major
reforms to deal with problems that may never unfold.
We next ask whether it is possible to ensure that we can provide for
f u t u re re t i rees through financial re f o rms made tod a y. Most analyses,
including that conducted by the trustees, confuse what they have inter-
preted as financial problems with the real burden of caring for retirees in
the future. If those financial problems do exist, their resolution requires
only relatively simple adjustments in accounting procedures. It does not
require higher taxes now or lower benefits in the near future or running
budget surpluses now. If the real problem of caring for retirees lies in pro-
ducing a sufficient quantity of re s o u rces tomorro w, it can be re s o l v e d
only by increasing productive capacity between today and the future and
by ensuring that a sufficient share of re s o u rces will be transferred to
tomorrow’s elderly. The first can be accomplished by increasing the rate
Does Social Security Need Saving?P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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of private and public investment; the second is best accomplished
through the tax system at the time the baby boom generation retires. All
the major proposals currently being discussed, ranging from calls to
“invest” the Social Security Trust Funds in the stock market to the presi-
dent’s plan to “lock away” projected federal budget surpluses in the Trust
Funds, will do nothing to ameliorate the real problem of caring for the
aged in the next century.
We next turn to an analysis of the real burden that might be faced by
future workers who will have to produce the goods and services required
by future retirees. This issue is quite separate from the supposed financial
crisis, and most analyses fail to distinguish between the two. Analyses
also confuse distributive issues with financial matters. The real burden of
caring for the aged will rise, but this increase is relatively small and
a p p a rently manageable even using the trustees’ rather pessimistic
assumptions. This leads us to a discussion of policies that might ease the
real burden. None of the major Social Security reforms advocated—by
the president or his critics—will significantly affect this problem. In fact,
some of the plans would merely increase the cost to today’s workers and
re t i rees without reducing the cost in the future. Such “pain without
gain” is bad social policy. 
We recommend several policy directions that can reduce the burd e n
t oday and tomorro w. Most import a n t l y, we advocate re t u rning Social
Security to a pay-as-you-go system by lowering payroll taxes now. The
tax base used to generate revenue for Social Security programs should be
b roadened. The Trust Funds should be capped. General fiscal policy
should be biased to increase productive capacity. These policies would
allow today’s workers to retain more income, but would not in any way
reduce the nation’s ability to care for tomorrow’s retirees; indeed, such
policies would enhance our productive capacity over the next few
decades.  
The Trustees’ Report on Actuarial Status
Most people think of Social Security as a re t i rement program but, in
re a l i t y, the Social Security system comprises several diff e rent pro g r a m s :
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), the hospital insurance (HI)Does Social Security Need Saving?
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p o rtion of Medicare, Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI), and
Disability Insurance (DI). Most economic analyses combine OASI and
DI (into OASDI) since the financial operations of both programs are
handled through special trust funds (the Federal Old-Age and Surv i v o r s
Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund)
established at the Tre a s u ry. Many of the programs included under the
rubric of Social Security are not targeted to the re t i red, and even OASI
has large numbers of beneficiaries who are not re t i red. For example, in
1997 nearly 10.5 million (almost 28 percent) of the 37.8 million benefi-
ciaries of OASI were spouses or survivors of covered workers. This must
be kept in mind when evaluating Social Security; it cannot be tre a t e d
as if it were nothing more than a pension fund, as is often done in
“ m o n e y ’s worth” calculations (briefly discussed below). We do focus on
OASDI as a re t i rement program in this brief, but remain fully aware
that it is much more than that. Our interest in this aspect of the pro-
gram is based on the remarkable volume of debate and the intensity of
the crisis mentality that the impending re t i rement of the baby boom
generation has engendered.  
It has long been known that the United States (and most other devel-
oped economies) will face a demographic imbalance by 2020 or 2030. As
a result of declining fertility rates, increasing longevity, and the baby
boom bulge, the number of re t i rees relative to the working population
will rise. In anticipation of this imbalance, revisions in benefits and rev-
enues were made in 1977 and 1983 that fundamentally changed the
Social Security program from pay-as-you-go to advance funding or the
accumulation of reserves. It was believed that benefits could be supple-
mented from these reserves when Social Security revenues begin to fall
short of expenditures. 
Section 201(c)(2) of the Social Security Act re q u i res that the Social
Security Board of Trustees make an annual report on the operations and
status of the OASI and DI Trust Funds. This includes requirements that
the trustees estimate the status of the funds for the ensuing five years and
provide a statement of the “actuarial status” of the Trust Funds. In recent
years the trustees have provided a statement of the financial situation of
the previous year, a detailed projection for the next 10 years (its “short-
range” forecast), and a projection for the next 75 years (its “long-range”
f o recast) to capture the effects of demographic shifts in working andretiring cohorts. In the trustees’ own words, the choice of the 75-year
horizon “will include the entire working and retired life span of the great
majority of workers now contributing to the program, as well as those
now receiving benefits” (Social Security Administration 1999, 9).
Because the trustees recognize the inherent difficulties in making projec-
tions over such a long time span, they use three sets of cost: “high cost”
(pessimistic), “intermediate cost,” and “low cost” (optimistic). 
It is important to note that the Social Security Act does not re q u i re
“actuarial balance” for the 75- year period. The trustees have established
their own methods for assessing actuarial status and their own rules for
solvency and liquidity of the funds. These rules are rather complex, but
essentially the rules for solvency require that the funds’ projected income
(expressed as a percent of taxable payroll) does not fall below 95 percent
of their projected expenditures (also expressed as a percent of taxable
payroll) over the 75-year period. To provide sufficient liquidity to ensure
timely payments, the rules require a contingency reserve of 8 to 9 per-
cent of program expenditures. 
In recent years the trustees have reported the actuarial status as the dif-
ference between the “summarized income rate” (the ratio of the present
value of payroll taxes to the present value of taxable payroll) and the
“summarized cost rate” (the ratio of the present value of expenditures to
the present value of the taxable payroll) over the valuation period .
When the summarized income rate equals the summarized cost rate, the
discounted expenditures equal the discounted revenues over the valua-
tion period. If the difference between the summarized income rate and
the summarized cost rate is a positive number, the OASDI is said to be
in actuarial balance. If the difference is a negative number, OASDI is in
actuarial imbalance. The trustees have traditionally allowed some toler-
ance because of the inherent difficulty in making long-range projections.
The program is said to be in “close actuarial balance” if estimated
income over the 75-year period is within 5 percent of estimated cost.
C u rre n t l y, that 5 percent tolerance would equal about 0.75 percent of
taxable payroll (Advisory Council on Social Security 1997b, 80). In
other words, if OASDI had an “actuarial gap” of negative 0.75, it would
still be said to be in close actuarial balance.
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Table 1 shows the income rate, cost rate, and resulting actuarial status
for each of the three projections.1 The low-cost projection results in a
positive actuarial balance for the first and second 25-year periods and
the entire long-range 75-year period. The intermediate-cost pro j e c t i o n
results in a positive actuarial balance for the first 25-year period only and
a negative actuarial balance of 2.07 percent over the 75-year period. The
high-cost projection for the 75-year period shows a negative 4.97 per-
cent balance. What these estimates indicate is that, if payroll taxes were
immediately increased by 2.07 percentage points in the interm e d i a t e
case or by 4.97 percentage points in the high case, OASDI would be in
positive actuarial balance for the 75-year period. For example, if the tax
on both employees and employers were raised by 1.035 percentage points
t od a y, on intermediate projections the coming “financial crisis” would
vanish. Furt h e rm o re, if we take into consideration the tolerance ru l e ,
which permits a shortfall of 0.75, the intermediate projection of actuarial
status is within 1.32 percent (2.07 less 0.75) of close actuarial balance, so
that the tax need be increased by only 0.66 percent on both employers
and employees to bring OASDI into close actuarial balance. We will
return to our assessment of the usefulness of such calculations later.
Table 1 Actuarial Balance, OASDI Trust Funds (Percentage of
Taxable Payroll)
Valuation Period Income Rate Cost Rate Actuarial Balance
Intermediate-cost assumptions
25 years: 1999–2023 13.81 13.04 0.77
50 years: 1999–2048 13.54 14.80 –1.26
75 years: 1999–2073 13.49 15.56 –2.07
Low-cost assumptions
25 years: 1999–2023 13.74 11.84 1.90
50 years: 1999–2048 13.45 12.92 0.53
75 years: 1999–2073 13.37 13.14 0.23
High-cost assumptions
25 years: 1999–2023 13.85 14.32 –0.47
50 years: 1999–2048 13.63 16.96 –3.34
75 years: 1999–2073 13.62 18.60 –4.97
Note: Totals do not necessarily equal the sums of rounded components.
Source: Social Security Administration (1999), Table II.F15.P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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The OASDI pro g r a m ’s operating surplus for 1998 amounted to $107 
billion (Social Security Administration 1999, Table II.F3). The inter-
mediate projection shows a surplus rising to just under $125 billion in
1999 and to $193 billion by 2008, the last year of the short-range fore-
cast (Figure 1). By the end of 1998 the Trust Funds had accumulated
$887 billion (see Table 2 for more detail). This will gro w, according to
the intermediate estimate, to approximately $2.3 trillion by the end of
2008 (with an annual surplus of $193 billion), an amount that is nearly
four times estimated total program expenditures for the year 2007. That
is to say, the Trust Funds would be sufficient to finance the program for
well over three years even with no tax revenues at the end of the first
decade of the next millennium. By comparison, the low-cost estimate
for 2008 is a surplus of $259 billion and a fund accumulation of $2.66
trillion; the high-cost estimate for 2008 is a surplus of $137 billion and
an accumulation of $2.08 trillion. Thus, re g a rdless of the assumptions
used, OASDI is projected to run large surpluses and to accumulate huge
Trust Funds throughout the next decade. Even the most pessimisticDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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p rojections result in Trust Funds that by the end of 2008 would be well
over what would be re q u i red to finance the program for two years with
no additional re v e n u e .
Under the intermediate assumptions (see Table 2), the trustees project
that through 2020 the Trust Funds will grow to $4.4 trillion.  Beginning
in 2022 program revenues will fall short of expenditures, requiring sales
of Trust Fund assets (Social Security Administration 1999, 24). The
assets would be exhausted by the year 2034, after which projected rev-
enues would meet just under three-quarters of expenditures. Under the
low-cost assumptions, however, the funds will rise to over five times
annual program expenditures in 2020, fall to over three times in 2060,
but remain fairly constant there a f t e r. By 2075 the funds would hold
more than $45 trillion in assets. 
What is important to notice is the apparent incongruity between a bal-
anced federal government budget, as projected by the Council of
Economic Advisors, and growing Trust Funds, which on current practice
must buy government securities. Each year Social Security runs a surplus,
that surplus adds to total government revenue (thus reducing a general
budget deficit or adding to a surplus) because Social Security funds are
put in the general budget in exchange for Tre a s u ry securities and the
Trust Funds are credited with nonmarketable Tre a s u ry securities that
e a rn interest. Even on the intermediate-cost projections, by year 2020
the Trust Funds would have to invest over $4.4 trillion in government
securities, an amount greater than the currently outstanding publicly
held government debt. On low-cost projections, the Trust Funds would
have to purchase $45 trillion of government securities by 2075! To meet
this higher goal, the federal government would have to issue new debt in
excess of a $150 billion a year by 2000, nearly $1 trillion a year by 2060,
and almost $2 trillion a year by 2075. Thus, even if the federal budget
remained balanced from this day forw a rd, the Tre a s u ry would become
increasingly indebted to OASDI. If the federal budget actually ran a sur-
plus over the next 25 years, as the president believes it will, the debt in
the hands of the public would be re t i red, but it would be replaced by
debt held by Social Security. This is essentially a debt the government
owes to itself. We will return to this point later, as it relates to the presi-
dent’s plan for saving Social Security.a13Does Social Security Need Saving?
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Analysis of the Trustees’ Assumptions
Many participants in the debate have pointed to the retiring baby
boomers as the source of the looming Social Security “crisis.”  However,
conventional mortality estimates show that a large portion of the baby
boom generation will have died before Trust Fund assets are exhausted in
2032. According to intermediate-cost assumptions, OASDI program rev-
enues will begin to fall short of expenditures after 2021 and the shortfall
will increase rapidly throughout the 75-year period. For example, re v-
enues will fall short by 13 percent in 2025, 30 percent in 2030, and 48
p e rcent in 2075. Thus, the source of a financing crisis is not only the
baby boom but also generation x and the “echo” of the baby boom. The
baby boom generation is only a minor demographic “blip” rather than
the sole cause of the crisis. The forecast of a crisis hinges on many
assumptions. Recall that, according to the intermediate-cost estimate,
the long-range actuarial shortfall is equal to 2.07 percent of taxable pay-
roll. It is useful to estimate how sensitive that imbalance is to changes in
the assumptions underlying the projections.
Low Fertility Rates
A rise in the fertility rate would increase program revenues above those
currently forecast. The fertility rate, which is currently 2.03 children per
woman, is projected to fall to 1.9 under the intermediate assumptions
(and to rise to 2.2 under the low-cost assumptions). Historically, the fer-
tility rate has fluctuated widely. It was 3.3 children per woman after
World War I, fell to 2.1 during the Great Depression, and then rose to
3.7 in 1957. Each increase of 0.1 in the fertility rate augments the long-
range actuarial balance by about 0.11 percent of taxable payroll. 
If the fertility rate were to rise by 1.7 (that is, to just over 3.7 children
per woman—where it stood in 1957), the actuarial gap would be reduced
by over 90 percent (given all other intermediate assumptions). Given
p resent demographic patterns, this is unlikely. However, if the fert i l i t y
rate were to rise only slightly, to 2.2, then 16 percent of the projected
actuarial gap would be eliminated. It should be noted that a fertility rate
of 2.1 is consistent with zero population growth, if death rates re m a i n
constant and net immigration is zero. Thus, the trustees’ assumption of aP roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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fertility rate of 1.9 would actually depopulate the country in the absence
of death rate reductions and net immigration inflows.
Slow Growth of the Labor Forc e
Additions to the labor force increase program revenue. The tru s t e e s
have assumed slow growth of the labor force—which is of course related
to low fertility and low net immigration. However, the size of the labor
force depends not only on population size but also on labor force partici-
pation rates. The participation rate for men was 75.5 percent in 1997; by
2075 the age-adjusted participation rate is assumed to fall to 74.0 per-
cent in the low-cost projection, to 73.9 percent in the intermediate case,
and to 73.8 percent in the high case. The participation rate for women
has been rising sharply in recent years, reaching 60.0 percent in 1997.
This is expected to increase by 2075 to 60.6 percent in the low- and
intermediate-cost projections and to 60.5 percent in the high-cost case.
The trustees did not perform a sensitivity analysis for the labor force par-
ticipation rate. However, the effects of adding workers to the labor force
t h rough increased participation should not be too dissimilar from the
effects of adding them through net immigration—adding half a million
to the labor force each year might close the actuarial gap by about 17
percent (see the discussion of immigration below).2
I n c reased Longevity 
I n c reased longevity (or, more accurately, a lower death rate) increases pro-
gram costs more than it increases revenue (holding all else equal). Each 10
p e rcentage point decrease in the death rate, relative to the assumed 34
p e rcent decrease, increases the long-range actuarial gap by about 0.34 per-
cent of taxable payroll. The intermediate projection assumes that the
death rate will fall by 34 percent over the 75-year period. If the death rate
fell by only 16 percent, the actuarial gap would be reduced from 2.07 per-
cent of taxable payroll to 1.47 percent (a reduction of 29 perc e n t ) .
Low Net Immigration
Net immigration increases program revenue more than it raises pro g r a m
costs. The intermediate projection assumes net immigration of 900,000Does Social Security Need Saving?
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per year. This re p resents a reduction from current net immigration. In
1997 net legal immigration was estimated to be 660,000 and illegal immi-
gration 300,000, or 960,000 total. Each 100,000 immigrants in addition to
the assumed 900,000 per year increases the long-range actuarial balance by
about 0.07 percent of taxable payroll. If net immigration were to reach 1.5
million per year, the actuarial gap would be reduced by 0.42 perc e n t a g e
points (or by about 20 percent). Note that if net immigration did in fact
fall to 900,000 in the year 2000, this would be equal to about 0.31 perc e n t
of total projected population. If annual net immigration then remained at
900,000, this would re p resent less than 0.24 percent of the interm e d i a t e
population projection by 2075. If net immigration is to remain at 0.31 
p e rcent of population, it would have to rise from 900,000 in 2000 to some-
thing closer to 1.2 million per year by 2075.3
Low Growth of Real Wa g e s
Fifth, growth of the nominal wage relative to inflation increases program
revenues relative to costs. The trustees have assumed that the consumer
price index (CPI) will grow at 3.3 percent per year. According to the
intermediate assumption, the nominal wage will grow at 4.2 percent per
year, or 0.9 percentage points faster than the CPI. This percentage point
difference is called the “real wage differential” (and may be expressed as
percent growth in real wage). Each 0.5 percentage point increase in the
assumed real wage differential increases the long-range actuarial balance
by about 0.51 percent of taxable payroll. If the nominal wage were to
grow at a rate of two percentage points above the CPI rate of inflation (a
real wage differential of 2.0), the actuarial gap would be closed by over
1.1 percentage points, representing 53 percent. That is, if the real wage
grew at 2.0 percent per year, rather than the assumed 0.9 percent (the
d i ff e rence between nominal growth of 4.2 percent and CPI growth of
3.3), more than half of the long-range actuarial shortfall would be made
up. In addition, the higher the rate of growth of the CPI, the better the
long-range actuarial balance becomes because tax revenues incre a s e
more than CPI-indexed benefits increase. Holding the real wage differ-
ential at 0.9, each percentage point increase in the CPI will increase the
long-range actuarial balance by about 0.23 percent of taxable payroll.
Growth of real wages is linked to productivity gains and to the relation
between wages and productivity growth. The trustees assume that P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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productivity growth will be 1.6 percent, 1.3 percent, and 1.0 percent for
the low, intermediate, and high projections, re s p e c t i v e l y. Intere s t i n g l y,
they assume that wages will grow much more slowly than productivity,
that is, by 1.4 percent, 0.9 percent, and 0.4 percent. This is because they
assume that hours worked will fall and that a larger share of worker com-
pensation will take the form of benefits rather than wages. Fringe bene-
fits such as private group health insurance, private pensions,
p rofit-sharing plans, and private group life insurance are exempt fro m
p a y roll taxes. These currently make up about 9 percent of employee
compensation. The elimination of this exemption would increase both
income and outgo (by increasing the base on which benefits and taxes
are calculated), but with a large net benefit for the OASDI actuarial bal-
ance. According to 1995 projections, the long-range actuarial deficit
would have been reduced from 2.17 to 1.15 percent of payroll (that is, by
nearly half) had the tax exemption for such fringe benefits been elimi-
nated (Advisory Council on Social Security 1997a, 139).4
P roductivity gains plus growth of the labor force together determ i n e
g rowth of real output. Given assumptions re g a rding low prod u c t i v i t y
g rowth, low population growth, and falling labor force part i c i p a t i o n
rates, it is not surprising that the trustees project low growth of real out-
put. Over the past 75 years our economy has had an average real rate of
g rowth of GDP equal to nearly 3.5 percent per year. (Note that this
p e r i od included the slow growth during the Great Depression and fol-
lowing the “oil price shock” of the early 1970s.) The trustees project that
over the next 75 years, real growth will slow to only 1.3 percent for the
intermediate projections. As we have said, this follows from assumptions
of low productivity growth and slow growth of the labor force. However,
there may be an inconsistency in assuming that these two factors will (or
can) both be slow.
As Pigeon and Wray (1999) show, countries with the slowest growth of
the labor force since 1970 have high growth of productivity, and coun-
tries with rapid labor force growth have low growth of labor productivity.
For example, between 1970 and 1996 the labor forces in the United
States and Canada increased by nearly 25 percent, the labor force in
We s t e rn Europe did not increase at all, and the labor force in Japan
i n c reased by only 5 percent. Over the same period labor prod u c t i v i t y
i n c reased by less than 20 percent in the United States, by about 30 
Public Policy BriefDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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percent in Canada, by 80 percent in Western Europe, and by a whopping
100 percent in Japan. Note also, that real per capita GDP growth was
slowest in the United States, which had the fastest labor force growth.
Western Europe and Japan, with essentially no growth of the labor force,
had more rapid growth of real output per person. Thus, there is no neces-
s a ry relation between labor force growth and real GDP growth. The
t rustees’ pessimistic projections with re g a rd to economic growth re s u l t
f rom the assumption that b o t h labor force and productivity will gro w
s l o w l y. However, if the experience of other countries with slow labor
force growth can shed any light on future trends, we believe that should
the U.S. labor force grow as slowly as the trustees project, labor produc-
tivity is likely to grow much faster than they project.5 This, in turn, will
increase real wage growth and thereby close the actuarial gap.
Falling Portion of Taxable Wa g e s
Clearly, the Social Security program’s income and outgo depend on tax-
able payroll. Earnings above $72,600 (in 1999) are not subject to the
OASDI payroll tax. In 1998 the ratio of taxable earnings to earnings in
O A S D I - c o v e red employment was 0.862. This ratio has been falling
since 1984, mainly due to the rising pro p o rtion of covered wages in
excess of the contribution and benefit base. In the past, 90 percent of all
wages fell below the contribution base. However, because of rising
inequality of wages (faster growth at the high end), today only 86 per-
cent of all wages fall below the base. Indeed, OASDI taxable payroll is
projected (on intermediate assumptions) to fall from 41 percent of GDP
in 1999 to only 35 percent in 2075. In other words, the total base on
which taxes are calculated for the purposes of supporting the rising num-
ber of the aged will amount to only 35 percent of GDP by 2075 (Social
Security Administration 1999, Table III.C2).
Again, the trustees did not perform a sensitivity analysis on these factors
for the 1997 report. However, the Advisory Council on Social Security
(1997a, 238) estimated that gradually increasing the OASDI contribu-
tion and benefit base beginning in 1997 so that by the year 2000, 90 per-
cent of covered earnings would be taxable (and indexed as under current
law thereafter) would reduce the actuarial gap by 0.50. Increasing the
base in the same manner, but then using indexation to maintain a con-
stant ratio of taxable earnings to compensation would improve the P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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actuarial balance by 1.21; in other words, this one change would elimi-
nate over half of the intermediate case actuarial shortfall. If OASDI
were to eliminate the contribution base entirely, making all earnings in
O A S D I - c o v e red employment taxable (that is, increasing the ratio of
taxable earnings to OASDI earnings to 1.00), the actuarial status of the
program would be improved so significantly that even on intermediate
assumptions, it would perhaps be in close actuarial balance. Similarly, if
Social Security taxes were imposed on a broader base, not just on the
OASDI taxable payroll (which, as noted, is only 41 percent of national
income and falls to 35 percent on intermediate assumptions by 2075),
the actuarial gap could be eliminated.
Other Factors
Other factors affecting the long-range actuarial balance include the real
i n t e rest rate (nominal interest rate less CPI inflation), the disability
incidence rate, and the disability termination rate. A higher real interest
rate increases program revenues (because earnings on Trust Fund assets
a re higher) and there f o re decreases the actuarial shortfall. A higher 
disability incidence rate increases costs and therefore adds to the actuar-
ial shortfall; the trustees assume incidence rates will rise for women on
all three sets of assumptions and will rise for men on the high- and 
i n t e rmediate-cost assumptions. A lower disability termination rate
increases costs and therefore adds to the actuarial shortfall; the trustees
assume termination rates due to death or recovery will fall significantly.
However, we will not examine these issues in more detail.
Trustees’ Unwarranted and Unnecessary Pessimism 
In sum, the expectation of long-range financing problems for OASDI
results primarily from assumptions re g a rding low fertility rates, slow
growth of the labor force, increased longevity, low net immigration, low
growth of real wages, and a falling portion of wages that are taxable, with
the low growth in the labor force and real wages being the most signifi-
cant. Real wages grew at a rate of 2.2 percent per year throughout the
1960s, but are assumed to grow at only 0.9 percent over the long run; the
labor force grew at a rate well above 2.0 percent per year previous to
1980, but is projected to grow at only 0.1 percent in 2020, 0.2 percent in
2030, and 0.1 percent after 2050. On the basis of these assumptions,Does Social Security Need Saving?
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financial problems will persist even after the demographic anomaly of
the baby boom is long gone. 
Small changes in these factors would alter the intermediate forecast suf-
ficiently that OASDI would be in close actuarial balance without resort-
ing to higher payroll taxes or reduced benefit payments. If real wage
growth were increased, if the portion of compensation received in wages
did not fall as much as assumed, if fringe benefits were taxed, and if the
contribution base were increased, the actuarial gap would be re d u c e d .
M o re o v e r, if real wage growth rose to 2.0 percent, if an extra 600,000
immigrants were added per year, and if fertility rates rose to 2.2, 89 per-
cent of the intermediate-case actuarial gap would be eliminated.
We thus agree with many other commentators who have argued that
the trustees have used assumptions that are unduly pessimistic. For
example, David Langer, a consulting actuary, has recently said that the
t rustees “have relied almost exclusively on macroeconomic speculation
based on a dismal view of the future economy. The actuarial assump-
tions produced are thus overly conservative, generate higher costs than
w a rranted and result in an unjustifiedly large imbalance of costs (bene-
fits and expenses) over income over the 75-year measuring period ”
(Langer 1999, 1). He questions whether the Trust Fund actuaries have
followed the guidelines established in the Actuarial Standards of
Practice (ASP) by the Actuarial Standards Board of the American
Academy of Actuaries. In part i c u l a r, ASP 27 recommends use of
“ a p p ropriate recent and long-term historical economic data,” and ASP
32 re q u i res that “If assumptions differ from recent experience . . . the
re p o rt should discuss [the factors] that led to the choice of assumptions
used.” Langer argues that the assumptions used in the forecast, espe-
cially those associated with forecasting real GDP growth, are far more
pessimistic than recent experience and long-term historical tre n d s
would suggest and that the trustees’ re p o rt does not provide a justifica-
tion for the use of such pessimistic assumptions. Langer shows that the
t rustees have consistently adopted more pessimistic assumptions in each
succeeding re p o rt since 1979. Furt h e rm o re, even the re p o rts before
1979 turned out to be overly pessimistic; the real world outcome consis-
tently proved to be better than the trustees’ projections. Langer
acknowledges that private programs must use conservative assumptions
to build up greater re s e rv e sP roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College a21
as a precaution against a major adverse event, such as a bank-
ruptcy or a poor economy, so that there will be adequate funds
available to cover the benefit values accrued to date should the
program have to be terminated. . . . [However, a] national social
insurance program such as Social Security . . . does not share
these concerns . . . [because] our federal government, as opposed
to a private employer or insure r, will continue indefinitely.
Workers and employers are re q u i red by law to participate and
thus cannot opt out of paying the Social Security payroll taxes;
further, if the economy sours as it did during the depression, the
taxing power of the government will be available to sustain
benefit payments. (Langer 1999, 1–2) 
Indeed, in their annual report for 1999, the trustees projected that the
Trust Funds would not be exhausted until 2034—two years later than
they had projected in their 1998 report (Social Security Administration
1999). Such corrections become necessary because economic gro w t h
continually exceeds the pessimistic assumptions adopted in the forecasts.
Although private programs should be biased toward conservatism, a pub-
lic program requires no such bias. The trustees have not provided a com-
pelling argument for their assumptions that the economy of the future
will be far worse than the economy of the past.
D i ff e rent Measures of the “Financial Gap”
OASDI as Percent of GDP
The crisis atmosphere surrounding the debate about Social Security
financing apparently is not well-founded. Leaving aside reasonable ques-
tions about the assumptions used in the forecasts, rather than looking just
at program revenues and costs, we can obtain a diff e rent measure of the
relative size of the “financial gap” by comparing projected OASDI income,
outgo, and balance with GDP projections. Figure 2 shows that, on inter-
mediate assumptions, OASDI income (excluding interest) is currently just
above 5 percent of GDP, outgo is just above 4.5 percent of GDP, and the
balance is 0.79 percent of GDP. In 2014 income (excluding interest) will
just cover outgo. By 2030 outgo will exceed income by about 1.8 perc e n tDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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of GDP. By 2060 the shortfall will reach slightly more than 2 percent of
GDP and slowly increase for the remainder of the 75-year period. 
The “looming financial crisis,” there f o re, re p resents a bit more than 2
percent of GDP. One can then ask, if things play out as assumed for the
intermediate projections, will the economy be able to increase the per-
centage of GDP devoted to OASDI beneficiaries by about 2 percent by
the year 2030? If the past is any guide, we believe the answer is yes. As
Dean Baker notes, between 1960 and 1995 “Social Security actually
increased by more as a share of GDP . . . than it will increase over the 35
years from 1995 to 2030” (1998, 4).
Ratio of Workers to Dependents 
The coming “crisis” can be examined from another vantage point:
changes in the ratio of the number of workers to the number of re t i re e s
over the 75-year span. Not surprisingly, given assumptions about rising P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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longevity and lower fertility rates, workers of the future will have to sup-
p o rt relatively more re t i red people than workers do now. As Figure 3
(left-hand scale) shows, the number of OASDI beneficiaries per 100 cov-
e red workers reached 31 in 1975 and will hold relatively steady until
2010. It will then rise steadily throughout the remainder of the 75-year
p e r i od, reaching 56 in 2075. To put it another way, while we now have
just over 3.3 workers per beneficiary, we will have fewer than 1.8 by 2075.
The rise in the ratio of beneficiaries to workers makes it appear that the
“burden” on future workers will increase by something less than a factor
of two. However, if we add the under age 20 population to the 65 and
over population to obtain a “dependent” population, we find that work-
ers in 1965 supported more dependents than any generation will through
the year 2075. The dependency ratio (the ratio of dependents to work-
ers) was nearly 0.95 in 1965 (see Figure 3, right-hand scale), indicating
that each person of “normal” working age supported about one person
who was not of normal working age. That ratio fell to 0.71 by 1995 and
will continue to fall slightly through 2010; it will rise to only 0.83 in
2075. Thus, although it is true that the number of people 65 and over—most of whom will be supported by people of working age—will rise rela-
tive to the number of workers, the combination of lower birth rates and
more women in the labor force has actually reduced the burden of sup-
porting those under age 20 by more than enough to offset the growing
burden of supporting the aged.
We realize, of course, that the needs of the dependent elderly differ fro m
those of the dependent young. Also, the attitude of the working popula-
tion toward paying payroll taxes to support “grandma and grandpa” is cer-
tainly diff e rent from its attitude toward using net income to care for
c h i l d ren at home. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that pro v i d-
ing for the educational, housing, re c reational, and medical needs of the
young baby boomers in the 1950s and 1960s re p resented a large transfer
of real re s o u rces toward production of the goods and services consumed
by those under age 20, and much of that transfer was accomplished
t h rough the tax system as workers and pro p e rty owners were taxed
whether they had children or not. Furt h e r, it must be re m e m b e red that
the typical family that was supporting baby boom children under age 20
had only one bre a d w i n n e r. The typical family that will be paying taxes to
take care of re t i red baby boomers will have two wage earners. 
B u rden of Providing Goods and Serv i c e s
Continuing with this analysis, we can look at the “real burden” of pro v i d-
ing the goods and services that will be needed by re t i rees. In 1910 it took
nearly 15 farmers to produce the food consumed by 100 Americans. If one
had projected in 1910 that by 1990 only 1 farmer would be available to
p roduce food for each 100 consumers, one might have projected famine
and mass starvation. Of course, that projection would have been gro s s l y
w rong. Today farmers produce sufficient food to feed the American popu-
lation with enough left over to export large quantities. As Figure 4 shows,
the pro p o rtion of farm workers in the population fell rapidly from nearly
15 percent in 1910 to about 1 percent today—with no adverse effects on
f o od consumption. In fact, the major problem facing farmers is that they
can produce far more than they can sell at profitable prices.
In the mid 1940s it took about 13 manufacturing workers to produce the
manufactured goods consumed by 100 Americans; in 1990 that number
had fallen by nearly half to 7. The decline in manufacturing workers is
Does Social Security Need Saving?
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not nearly as sharp as the decline in farm workers, but the typical con-
sumer’s basket of manufactured items is much larger today than in 1945.
Of course, many items in that basket are imported, and the United
States exports many manufactured goods. We can get a better idea of the
extent of the increase in nonworkers that each worker can support by
looking at rising labor productivity. As Figure 5 shows, over the past 50
years worker productivity has doubled or even more than tripled in some
sectors. If labor productivity doubles over the next 50 years, there will be
no problem in producing the basket of goods and services that will be
re q u i red by all consumers, including the rising numbers of re t i re e s .
Again, on current projections, OASDI will re q u i re about 7 percent of
GDP from 2030 through 2075, up from a bit less than 5 percent today. It
appears reasonable to assume that society will be able to increase the
Does Social Security Need Saving?
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portion of goods and services going to OASDI beneficiaries by two per-
centage points in the middle of next century. 
Thus, ignoring the financial gap, there does not appear to be any loom-
ing crisis in ability to produce sufficient goods and services for workers
and nonworkers and to make them accessible to workers and nonwork-
ers. Even the trustees’ intermediate projections show that the real wages
of workers will increase by 75 percent over the next half-century. Even if
tax rates would have to rise to cover the expected financial gap due to
demographic shifts, tomorro w ’s workers would still have much higher
standards of living. In other words, after moving a greater share of total
GDP to OASDI recipients, workers will be left with a much larger real
basket of goods and services than they consume today—even on what
might be overly pessimistic assumptions about real growth rates. No mat-
ter what one thinks of the “financial” burden on future workers, the
“real” burden does not appear to be excessive at all.P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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Can Accumulating the OASDI Trust Funds Ensure 
That Retirees Will Be Provided For?
Whether we assume that there is no looming crisis or that the future will
unfold more or less as the trustees have projected, it is still appropriate,
even necessary, to think in long-range terms. Can we, or should we, do
anything today to ensure that the elderly will be cared for tomorro w ?
The current belief behind the operation of OASDI is that a large trust
fund can help ease the burden created by demographic changes and slow
p rojected growth of taxable real wages. The purpose of a trust fund is
thought to be to accumulate financial re s e rves now, which can be
depleted in later years, when Social Security program expenditure s
exceed the revenues that will be generated from a shrinking taxable
base. In other words, annual surpluses will be “saved” over the next 20
years in order to provide for the future consumption of retiring baby
boomers. The question is, Can the current generation, as a whole, save
in real terms for its future retirement?
If the current generation were to abstain from consumption, dig holes,
and bury goods and services to be excavated and consumed 30 or 40
years hence (assuming no deterioration of the buried supplies), they
could provide for their future consumption by saving in real term s .
P re s u m a b l y, the pharaohs had something like this in mind when they
had goods and people to provide services buried with them in the
pyramids. It is clear, however, that, with the notable exception of
o w n e r-occupied housing, most of the consumption that occurs in, say,
2020 will have to be provided for by production in that year. The
Social Security Trust Funds and all the other public and private pen-
sion funds are saving only in financial terms, in the hope that re t i re e s
will be able to purchase real goods and services for consumption when
they re t i re. 
Is it possible for society to do anything today to increase the quantity of
goods and services that can and will be produced tomorrow, relative to
what otherwise would have been produced (that is, in the absence of a
policy change) for the consumption not only of retirees but also of work-
ers and nonretirees who do not work? If not, then the financial savings
represented by all public and private pension funds can affect only the
distribution of the goods and services that will be produced in 2020.Does Social Security Need Saving?
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This is not an insignificant issue. If the quantity of goods and services is
not increased, society may well want to change the amount of goods and
services distributed to the elderly and to other demographic groups. The
thinking behind much of the debate over Social Security seems to center
on the fear that if we do not increase financial saving, funds will be inad-
equate to finance a sufficient share to the elderly to meet their needs. 
However, if this is what the debate is really about, most of the solutions
p roposed thus far have at best an uncertain probability of succeeding.
This is because they center on accumulating financial re s e rves in the
next few years—by some combination of reduced benefits and increased
tax rates and by increasing the re s e rves’ growth rate, for example, by
“investing” them in the stock market to obtain higher returns than those
expected from government bonds. It is supposed that the larger reserves
will postpone the “day of reckoning” since their interest earnings will
supplement payroll tax receipts and assets can be sold when total re v-
enues fall short of expenditures. 
Let us first examine the thinking behind proposals that would increase
the distribution going to the elderly in say 2020 through accumulation of
a larger trust fund. This is the path recommended by President Clinton
in his 1999 State of the Union Address when he proposed that just over
60 percent of projected government surpluses over the next 15 years be
“set aside” for the OASDI Trust Funds. The Treasury would use the sur-
pluses to retire outstanding debt currently held by the public, but would
then issue an equivalent amount of debt (that is, 62 percent of the total
budget surplus each year) to be held in the Trust Funds. However, unless
accumulation of the Trust Funds actually enhances society’s ability to
produce goods and services in the year 2020, the output to be distributed
will be exactly the same whether the Trust Funds are larger or smaller. In
this case, the only economic justification for larger Trust Funds is the
belief that the larger size will increase the distribution going to the retir-
ing baby boomers. 
After 2020 the Trust Funds would begin to sell their assets to increase the
nominal income of the beneficiaries beyond the income that can be pro-
vided out of payroll taxes. If these sales were made to workers (and other
nonelderly income earners) who otherwise would have used their income
to purchase consumption goods and services, Trust Fund asset sales couldP roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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achieve the desired result of shifting the distribution of consumption
t o w a rd the elderly. However, this is by no means a foregone conclusion.
The Tre a s u ry debt held by OASDI is nonmarketable—it cannot be sold to
the public. OASDI must convert this debt to cash to cover spending. The
Tre a s u ry then has to issue checks to cover this conversion. If the Tre a s u ry ’s
total revenue from all taxes is not equal to its non–Social Security spend-
ing plus the nonmarketable bonds redeemed by OASDI (equal to
O A S D I ’s deficit), the Tre a s u ry will incur a general budget deficit. 
Let us ignore for a moment the possibility that the Tre a s u ry would
increase taxes in an attempt to balance its budget, so that it issues new
debt equal to its deficit. It is possible that Treasury bond sales might sim-
ply depress asset prices (not only of the government bonds being sold but
also of other public as well as private assets) either directly or because
the Fed decided to increase interest rates in the belief that budget
deficits would cause inflation. If the sales were made to individuals or
institutions that do not reduce consumption commensurately, the
increased income going to the elderly recipients of OASDI would simply
compete with consumer demand that had not been affected by the asset
sales. The primary result in this case could be inflation of prices of con-
sumer goods and services rather than deflation of asset prices. There
could be complex secondary and tertiary effects set off by the asset sales
that are hard to estimate in advance.
For this reason, we believe there is no way to guarantee that accumula-
tion of the Trust Funds will actually have the desired result of shifting dis-
tribution toward the beneficiaries, and it is not clear that larger Tru s t
Funds will result in a more desirable distribution. Is there a better and
m o re direct way to ensure that the distribution will be shifted toward
re t i rees? Ye s — t h rough use of the tax system. In the year 2020, if it is
decided that the elderly should get a larger share of the distribution, then
p a y roll taxes can be increased (reducing workers’ disposable income) and
benefit payments to the elderly can be increased. According to interm e d i-
ate projections, it would be necessary to achieve a shift of just under 2.4
p e rcent of GDP by 2075 relative to the share devoted in 1998 to meet all
OASDI obligations, including obligations to the nonelderly. Note that if
the goal is to affect distribution in the year 2020, it is far more direct to
raise payroll taxes in the year 2020 than to raise them today in an
attempt to accumulate financial assets to be sold in the year 2020 in theDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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hope that this might indirectly affect distribution. Note also that even if
nonmarketable Tre a s u ry debt is held by the Trust Funds, to convert that
debt to cash would re q u i re the Tre a s u ry to issue new debt or to generate
tax revenue in excess of what will be re q u i red for other govern m e n t
spending to make the cash payment to the fund without increasing gen-
eral budget deficits. But this is exactly what would be re q u i red even if the
Trust Funds had no financial holdings. 
This analysis casts doubt on the trustees’ calculation of actuarial balance,
which presumes that a tax today can affect the distribution going to
OASDI beneficiaries 75 years into the future. We see no reason to sup-
pose that an increase of the tax rate by 2.07 percentage points tod a y
would in any direct way shift the distribution of resources toward retirees
in 2075. We believe it is inherently counterproductive to attempt to
maintain long-range actuarial balance as the trustees are attempting to
do. It would be far preferable to re t u rn to the Social Security Act’s
re q u i rement that the trustees simply re p o rt the actuarial status for the
ensuing five years. As Langer (1999) correctly argues, a public program
does not need to be run like a private program. Planning far into the
future and accumulating a fund to deal with contingencies may be neces-
sary for a private program, but it is not necessary for a public program,
which uses involuntary taxes (such that workers and employers cannot
choose to leave the program) as its revenue source.
Running an OASDI surplus today generates several kinds of undesirable
market distortion. Payroll taxes are higher than what is required to meet
OASDI expenditures, which distorts labor markets. This makes
American labor more expensive than necessary, putting domestic pro-
duction at a competitive disadvantage, and it also encourages substitu-
tion of capital for labor, displacing workers and possibly raising
unemployment. Asset prices may be higher today than they would be in
the absence of an OASDI surplus. Similarly, asset sales that would take
place as the baby boom re t i res could distort asset markets; asset prices
would be depressed by the flood of retirements as private and public pen-
sion funds sell assets to meet expenditures and Trust Fund or Tre a s u ry
sales would only make matters worse. 
F u rt h e r, the Social Security surplus obfuscates government accounting,
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c a rried “on” or “off” budget, whether they should be “set aside” fro m
general budget revenues, and whether the federal government is re a l l y
running a balanced budget. We do not wish to enter the debate about
the wisdom of balanced budgets, but it is difficult to argue that the
OASDI programs ought to run surpluses to offset deficits in the rest of
the budget. As we have pointed out, the tax base for OASDI falls on just
over 40 percent of GDP, making it a particularly inequitable re v e n u e
source for the purpose of offsetting general budget deficits. 
Milton Friedman has recently made a similar argument, pointing out
that paying taxes today to build up a trust fund cannot help to provide
for future retirees and that a trust fund is little more than an accounting
gimmick.
Taxes paid by today’s workers are used to pay today’s retirees. If
money is left over, it finances other Government spending—
though, to maintain the insurance fiction, paper entries are cre-
ated in a “trust fund” that is simultaneously an asset and a
liability of the Government. When the benefits that are due
exceed the proceeds from payroll taxes, as they will in the not
v e ry distant future, the diff e rence will have to be financed by
raising taxes, borrowing, creating money or reducing other
G o v e rnment spending. And that is true no matter how larg e
the “trust fund.” (Friedman 1999)
Herb Stein (1999) seemed to reach the same conclusion when he
humorously recommended that Social Security be saved simply by issu-
ing $10 trillion in Treasury securities today: Why wait for accumulation
of an OASDI surplus and why save Social Security only through 2055
(as President Clinton’s plan is supposed to do) or through 2075? If $10
trillion is not enough, the Treasury can immediately issue $50 trillion or
$50 quadrillion to the Trust Funds to save them for eternity.
In summary, it would be far more straightforw a rd to increase the tax on
workers in the year 2020 and increase the benefits paid to re t i rees at
that time than to try to accumulate financial re s e rves over the next 21
years in the hope that the OASDI trustees (or the Tre a s u ry) could sell
financial assets in the year 2020 and thereby affect the distribution of
real goods and services going to the elderly. This could work smoothlyDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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only if those who obtained income from working in the year 2020
decided to reduce consumption in that year in order to buy the assets
being sold to provide for re t i rees. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the
asset sales would merely depress asset prices and that competition for
consumption by workers and re t i rees would drive up prices of goods and
s e rvices. While it is conceivable that the net result would be a gre a t e r
distribution going to the elderly, that result is not assured. Why not
simply use the tax system in the year 2020 or 2030 or 2075 to guarantee
the desired result? The burden of providing real goods and services to
re t i rees in 2020, 2030, and 2075 will be borne by workers in those years
re g a rdless of the tax imposed tod a y. And if the level of goods and ser-
vices to be produced cannot be increased by actions taken tod a y, then
the burden that will be borne cannot be reduced by anything we do
t od a y.
This argument hinges on the assumption that accumulation of a tru s t
fund does not directly affect the quantity of goods and services that will
be produced in a future year. Most conventional economic theory holds
that the long-run growth path of the economy is not easily changed.
Most economic analysis presumes that long-run growth cannot be
affected by government policy. Thus, at the very least, the argument for
accumulation of a trust fund as a means of increasing society’s ability to
provide for the needs of OASDI 35 years into the future rests on shaky
t h e o retical grounds. If this argument is rejected, then the pro p o s e d
reforms boil down to schemes that would merely attempt to shift the dis-
tribution to retirees. But if this shift is all that reformers intend, it can be
accomplished much more simply and effectively through use of the tax
system at the time the shift is desired.
If economists believe there is something like a “natural” long-run growth
rate, they must advocate a pay-as-you-go system for the long run and
must conclude that payroll taxes should be reduced now so that program
revenues and costs would be more closely aligned; payroll taxes would
then have to be increased in the future to maintain the desired distribu-
tion of resources to beneficiaries. On the grounds that accumulation of a
trust fund is not likely to have a great impact on long-run growth, it can-
not assure the desired future distribution of resources, and it distorts cur-
rent and future market prices, we conclude that it makes little sense to
accumulate a huge trust fund.P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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Private and Non–Social Security Pension Plans
If it makes little economic sense to accumulate OASDI Trust Funds to
p rovide for re t i rees, does it make sense for private and non–Social
Security public pension funds to accumulate trust funds? The answer is
yes. Let us briefly examine the diff e rence between Social Security and the
other plans. Most pension plans today are defined contribution plans,
with benefits determined by contributions and successful management of
the funds. When an employee re t i res in 2020, her nominal benefits will
depend to a large extent on the decisions made by fund managers and on
the perf o rmance of asset markets around the time she re t i res. Her re a l
benefits will depend on the basket of goods and services that she will be
able to purchase on markets. If her pension plan perf o rms poorly in the
years before her re t i rement, her re t i rement basket will be small because
her plan will have to rely on asset sales for the most part to pay her bene-
fits. At best her pension fund could raise the contributions re q u i red of its
working members—a small subset of the total workers in the country and
a risky proposition on which most of tod a y ’s fund participants would not
wish to re l y. The non–Social Security fund can affect the distribution
going to its re t i rees only by changing the nominal benefits paid out, that
is, only indirectly as beneficiaries try to purchase on the market the good s
and services they desire. In other words, the non–Social Security pension
plan has no direct way of shifting the distribution of output toward its
pensioners and thus cannot guarantee any real benefits. 
In contrast, Social Security can more directly affect distribution because
not only can it raise nominal benefits, it also can increase its revenues
substantially by levying a tax on all payrolls. In effect, it has both blades
of the scissors (benefits and payroll taxes) to use to redistribute real con-
sumption to beneficiaries. Thus, quite apart from any accounting ru l e s
imposed on private pension plans by public law, they cannot operate the
way a public, economy-wide re t i rement plan can operate. Even if it is
true that accumulation of trust funds cannot affect the quantity of goods
and services to be distributed in the future, private pension plans and
non–Social Security public plans must accumulate trust funds to remain
solvent and satisfy liquidity needs. 
This does not mean that accumulating funds will necessarily save private
plans from experiencing a crisis when the baby boom retires. Long-termDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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demographic changes do have effects on markets. The buildup of infla-
tion in the 1960s and 1970s throughout the developed world may have
been fueled in part by the baby boom bulge and its needs for increased
i n f r a s t ru c t u re (schools, hospitals, transportation) and consumer good s .
The strong asset markets of the 1990s are due in part to the fact that
baby boomers are in their peak earning years and are purchasing assets
for their retirement years, either individually or through pension plans.
As the baby boom retires and tries to sell assets in the next century, it is
possible that asset prices may be negatively affected—with real impacts
on the quantity of goods and services that pensioners will be able to pur-
chase. Thus, while an individual can, and should, save for future retire-
ment, exactly what that saving will be able to purchase in the future will
depend on macroeconomic factors, including those that result fro m
demographic trends. Society’s response to projected trends can be, and
should be, different from the response of individuals or large subsets of
the population. Indeed, Social Security will be able to provide a “safety
net” for individuals in private pension plans precisely because it can use
both blades of the scissors as necessary to affect distribution in a manner
that no private plans can.
Can We Enhance Our Future Ability to Pro d u c e ?
Most proponents of reform seem to believe that actions taken today can
affect the quantity of goods and services that will be available in the year
2020 to distribute among all groups in society—even though conven-
tional economic theory disagrees. However, once we focus on the issue
of whether growth can be affected, debates about the accumulation of
the Trust Funds and whether returns in the stock market can beat the
returns on government bonds become irrelevant. What is at issue is the
best means of stimulating production in the year 2020. How we go about
answering that question may depend on our view of the nature of the
constraints on economic growth.
A Supply-Constrained Economy
It is possible that the economy has grown relatively slowly since 1973
because it is supply constrained, and it is possible that supply constraints
will be the cause of the slow growth that even the low-cost forecasts P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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presume. A supply-constrained economy needs greater capacity to pro-
duce; it needs more resources, higher quality resources, or better technol-
o g y. The capacity to produce can be increased, for example, thro u g h
more investment in physical capital (public infrastructure, private infra-
structure and machinery) and human capital (more education and train-
ing to increase labor productivity). It can be increased through policies
that would spur resource extraction and encourage resource mobility (for
example, policies to increase international flows and to loosen immigra-
tion restrictions). In a supply-constrained economy, noninvestment
spending can “crowd-out” investment, thus, leading to lower gro w t h .
Policies to reduce consumption (either by households or by government)
would allow both private and public investment to increase, generating
higher growth. While government spending (whether deficit financed
or not) is generally believed to lower long-run growth, this depends first
on whether the system is supply constrained and second on the nature
of the government spending. As Aschauer (1998) and others have
shown, much government spending actually enhances productivity and
increases potential growth.
Assuming that the economy is, and will continue to be, supply con-
strained, can changes to the Social Security system affect these con-
straints? Shifting to the advance-funded model in 1983 raised tax rates
and lowered benefits to generate large surpluses, but it has not directly
encouraged creation of more or higher quality re s o u rces. It is possible
that the higher tax rates have reduced current consumption, re l e a s i n g
resources that can be used for investment. On the other hand, the lower
c u rrent consumption might have depressed the incentive to invest—
simply generating unemployed re s o u rces and thereby removing supply
constraints while creating demand constraints. 
One justification given for accumulating a trust fund surplus (as part of
a general government surplus) is that a government surplus will incre a s e
national saving and thereby stimulate investment. There are many re a-
sons to doubt this result, but a primary problem is that it re q u i res that
the rest of the federal budget does not move toward deficit in compen-
sation (that is, either because the surplus slows the economy and lowers
other tax receipts or because policymakers increase other types of
spending or reduce other taxes as they supposedly “spend” Social
S e c u r i t y ’s surplus).Does Social Security Need Saving?
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Further, even if it is true that a government surplus can add to national
saving and encourage investment, it is not at all clear that this should be
the responsibility of OASDI. OASDI, as noted above, is not a bro a d -
based program; the taxable OASDI base is far less than half of national
income. If a government surplus can be used to stimulate growth, this
would be more properly undertaken as a general fiscal policy. First, a gen-
eral fiscal policy would be much more effective because it can use the
entire federal tax system, not just the smaller OASDI tax base, allowing
a faster growth rate to be achieved. Second, since any growth achieved
would be beneficial across society, it is equitable that all individuals
share the cost (higher taxes), rather than only those on OASDI-covered
payrolls. An objection might be that Congress and the president do not
have the political will to undertake such measures, but it makes little
sense to re f o rm Social Security in an attempt to accomplish what our
elected representatives should, but will not, do.
A related justification for accumulating a trust fund is that balances can
be used to increase investment directly, for example, by purchasing pri-
vate equities. Many objections have been raised to this plan, and we do
not intend to repeat them (Baker 1998). However, it is important, again,
to ask whether the task of increasing investment should be the responsi-
bility of OASDI. If it is decided that government should attempt to
stimulate growth by direct investment in the market, this would be bet-
ter accomplished as a general fiscal policy; that is, it should be done out
of the general budget. Similarly, policies to increase human capital or to
encourage resource mobility or to finance research and development are
all better left to general government revenues and spending than to
OASDI revenues and expenditures.
In conclusion, even if we live in a supply-constrained economy, and even
if we can do things today to increase long-run growth, it is difficult to
make the argument that this should be done through levying payroll taxes
g reatly in excess of what is re q u i red to finance OASDI benefits tod a y.
A Demand-Constrained Economy
A demand-constrained economy operates with substantial excess
c a p a c i t y. Any type of spending can raise demand, stimulate output, and
raise economic growth, which in turn will encourage investment andP roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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thus raise potential output. Increasing investment alone may not work
in a demand-constrained economy because the investment may just
lead to more excess capacity. It may be better to stimulate other non-
investment spending, which then creates private incentive to invest.
G o v e rnment spending, even if it is deficit financed, will raise demand
and thus stimulate investment. On the other hand, a government sur-
plus actually hinders demand (by taxing more than it spends) and
reduces gro w t h .
If our economy is demand constrained, then accumulating a trust fund
would depress growth unless the balance were offset by a deficit on the
rest of the government’s budget. A pay-as-you-go Social Security system
would be preferable to an advanced-funded system for any demand-
constrained economy. One could even argue that OASDI deficits in the
f u t u re would be good precisely because they would stimulate demand.
However, for the reasons we examined above, it is better to leave such
a g g regate demand stimulation to the rest of the govern m e n t ’s budget.
This should be a matter for general budget policy rather than for a par-
ticular government program.
Is our economy demand constrained or supply constrained? We believe that
on balance, the evidence is that our economy is usually demand con-
strained. We expect that in coming years demand constraints will be even
worse than they have been since 1973. As evidence, we point to chro n i c
downsizing of firms, falling commodity prices, stagnant intermediate good s
prices, high unemployment rates in most of the world, and unused capacity
t h roughout the world. The aftere ffects of the Asian crisis, still thre a t e n i n g
Latin America, Europe, and the United States, are in part due to excess
capacity and inadequate world demand. We see little reason to fear, at least
in the near future, that a constraint will arise from insufficient capacity. 
F i n a l l y, in our judgment it makes little diff e rence for the debate over
Social Security re f o rm whether our economy is supply constrained or
demand constrained. A pay-as-you-go system is preferred in either case.
Achieving faster economic growth is a matter of good fiscal and mone-
t a ry policy and is not the responsibility of OASDI. Thus, whether we
need to stimulate demand or supply, there is no justification for accumu-
lating vast Social Security reserves.Does Social Security Need Saving?
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Investment in Stocks, Intra- and Interg e n e r a t i o n a l
Redistribution, and Money’s Wo rth Estimates
T h e re are many other issues related to Social Security that are being
debated, most of which fall outside the purview of this brief. Complete
privatization has been proposed. It is claimed that through individuals’
investment of retirement funds in the stock market privatization could
contribute to increasing the long-run growth rate, thereby reducing the
burden placed on future generations. It has also been argued that even if
burdens on future generations are not reduced, privatization is still desir-
able. However, we believe that the objections that have been raised
overwhelm any possible benefits of privatization. For example, if benefits
a re closely tied to stock market perf o rmance, workers who happen to
reach retirement age when the market is low will suffer from low benefits
throughout their retirement.
Some re f o rm proposals would “invest” part of the Trust Funds in the
stock market. Many valid objections have been raised against this plan,
including the argument that projections of high stock market returns are
wildly optimistic (Baker 1998; Cadette 1997; Ball et al. 1997; Advisory
Council on Social Security 1997a, 1997b). In addition, it is clear that
Americans prefer to retain Social Security as a public program. We
would add that if public investment in the stock market is such a great
idea, then why doesn’t the Tre a s u ry play the investment game to its
advantage, issuing debt to the public at a low interest rate and taking
positions in the stock market to earn high returns? Why limit the gov-
e rn m e n t ’s involvement to the Social Security Trust Funds? Indeed,
unless the government does something like this, the stock market may
be doomed to poor returns as the baby boom retirement leads to sales of
stocks both by private funds and by a partially privatized Social Security.
However, no matter what the possible returns, our analysis above indi-
cates that the thinking behind  proposals for public investment in stocks
is flawed. No matter how large the Trust Funds, they cannot directly ease
the burden of providing for future retirees nor can they directly increase
the share of distribution going to re t i rees. Those who argue that stock
returns will be higher than the return on Treasury debt simply have notP roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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come to terms with the nature of the future burden. Tax hikes will be
n e c e s s a ry in the future, if trustee projections concerning economic
growth and demographics prove correct. 
Other analyses are concerned with intragenerational re d i s t r i b u t i o n .
They look at Social Security as if it were a pension plan, calculating
each cohort’s amount of contributions and return on contributions, that
is, expected benefits. Not surprisingly, the rate of return varies greatly by
income class and by retirement date. Earners with low income generally
get a much better re t u rn on their “investment” than do earners with
income close to the contribution base. This re p resents a re d i s t r i b u t i o n
within a generation. Social Security has always had a significant redistri-
bution component (indeed, many of those who receive OASDI benefits
never paid into the program directly); on the other hand, by setting a
contribution base and by eschewing means-testing for most benefits, pay-
roll taxes are not pro g ressive and benefits are widely distributed acro s s
income classes. We do not intend to examine this issue in more detail;
a rguments that would pre s e rve intragenerational redistribution can be
found in reports of the Advisory Council (1997a, 1997b).
I n t e rgenerational equity and money’s worth estimates deserve more
attention. We agree with Ball et al. (1997) that ensuring that each gen-
eration obtains a good return on its contributions should not be a high
priority. We do not even believe that this is an attainable goal, given the
changes in demographic patterns. The first Social Security re t i re e s
obtained high re t u rns on their investment because of highly favorable
demographics. There was a relatively small elderly population, but a
large and rapidly growing working-age population and a well-performing
economy that ensured high wage growth. As a result, low payroll taxes
generated sufficient income to meet benefits. This result will be obtained
in any economy with these demographics.
In a sense, the pattern of return is similar to a Ponzi finance or “pyramid”
scheme, with returns that are high for the early entrants, but unsustain-
able for later entrants because the base cannot continue to expand as
rapidly as time passes. All mature societies face a similar problem: gener-
ous living standards and rising status of women contribute to lower fertil-
ity rates and lower death rates, which lower population growth and
increase the proportion of elderly. The burden of supporting the elderlyDoes Social Security Need Saving?
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has to rise in such a society. However, money’s worth estimates then
come into play. Against the cost of supporting the elderly must be
weighed the advantages of slow population growth. Fewer resources have
to be devoted to increasing the stock of housing, schools, roads, govern-
ment buildings, and so on (partially offset by the need to increase the
stock of hospitals and long-term care facilities); social unrest and crime
tend to fall, and the pace of environmental degradation can slow. When
money’s worth is viewed in this broader context, it becomes clear that
slow population growth creates problems, but also comes in concert with
substantial benefits. 
Policy Recommendations
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the OASDI portion of Social
Security does not face a financial crisis. We believe that the tru s t e e s
have been overly cautious in their intermediate long-range forecast, but
even on the basis of these assumptions we find no reason to suppose that
a financial crisis looms in the future. There is also no crisis regarding the
burden on future workers of providing the real goods and services that
will be required by the elderly. Even with a rising number of the retired
relative to the working population, the trustees project that real wages of
future workers will be much higher than those enjoyed today, in spite of
assumed low growth rates of real output.  Further, we see no compelling
a rgument that changes in OASDI policy made today could ameliorate
any problems that might be encountered long into the future. It is proba-
ble that tax rates will have to be increased in the future, perhaps even
before 2020. However, the increases will be relatively small. After 2030,
perhaps 2 percent more of GDP will have to be devoted to the OASDI
beneficiaries than is now devoted. While not insignificant, this is surely
feasible without causing an undue burden on future workers. Thus, we
are encouraged to make the following recommendations.
1. OASDI should gradually be re t u rned to a pay-as-you-go system. We find no
reason to suppose that accumulating large balances in the Trust Funds is a
p roper way to provide for future re t i rees. Thus, payroll tax rates should be
reduced over the next few years and then increased as re q u i red in the
f u t u re. This would allow tod a y ’s workers to retain more income, but would
not in any way reduce the nation’s ability to care for tomorro w ’s re t i rees. P roviding for Retirees throughout the Twenty-first Century
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2. Discussion should begin about the proper tax base to use to generate re v e n u e
for OASDI. Given demographic changes, which will reduce the working
population relative to OASDI beneficiaries, a broader base is pre f e rre d .
This is particularly important given that covered payroll is expected to
fall significantly relative to GDP. Discussion should include the possible
elimination of the contribution base or at least of adjustments to this base
to ensure that a constant percent of payroll falls below the base. Inclusion
of fringe benefits in the taxable base might also be pursued.
3. The Trust Funds should be capped at no more than 100 percent of expendi -
t u res, an amount generally thought to be sufficient to see the programs thro u g h
back-to-back re c e s s i o n s. We would actually prefer to cap the Trust Funds at a
much lower figure, since a re s e rve of 8 to 9 percent is sufficient to meet liq-
uidity needs and funding from the general budget could be provided in
s e v e re recessions as necessary. Because the Trust Funds are already well over
200 percent of expenditures, this means that deficits can be run over the
next several years until the funds fall to 100 percent of annual spending. 
4. General fiscal policy should be biased to encourage faster growth, gre a t e r
employment, and higher labor force part i c i p a t i o n. For example, as the nation
moves to negative natural population growth, we may wish to incre a s e
significantly the numbers of legal immigrants to ensure a growing labor
f o rce. Or, we may wish to increase substantially public investment in
human capital and infrastru c t u re to increase productive capacity. Such
initiatives are in the realm of general fiscal policy and clearly lie outside
the role and function of the Social Security system, but while benefiting
the whole society, they would also increase the financial and real outlook
for OASDI.
5. The trustees should abandon the use of long-range forecasts of actuarial bal -
a n c e. Attempting to make such forecasts results from a flawed understand-
ing of the way in which society provides future benefits. The tru s t e e s
should re p o rt actuarial balance for no more than a five-year period. For
the long-range, it is sufficient to re p o rt projections of annual pro g r a m
income, outgo, and balance.
6. Major changes, such as partial or complete privatization, reduction of bene -
fits, and extension of re t i rement age, have no place in the re f o rm of OASDI
p ro g r a m s . These, too, result from a flawed view of the operation of the
p rograms and the extent and nature of a Social Security “crisis.”Does Social Security Need Saving?
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N o t e s
1.  T h roughout this paper we use estimates and projections from the 1999
Annual Report of the Trustees (Social Security Administration 1999).
2.  This is based on the estimate that each additional 100,000 net immigrants
i n c rease the long-range actuarial balance by about 0.07 percent of taxable
payroll.  Using this estimate to calculate the effect on increased labor force
p a rticipation probably underestimates the impact of higher part i c i p a t i o n
rates because the participation rate of immigrants is less than 100 percent.
However, the information provided in the sensitivity analysis does not per-
mit us to make a more accurate estimate.
3.  Again, we do not have sufficient information to make an accurate calcula-
tion. However, 0.31 percent of 380 million (which is the intermediate pro-
jection of the population in 2075) is 1.2 million net immigrants. This
understates the number of net immigrants that would be re q u i red because
population would be growing faster and thus achieve a higher level for every
year after 2000 so that the actual population would be higher than the 379
million the Trustees have estimated for 2075.
4.  Including employer- p rovided private group health and life insurance in
OASDI taxable earnings, subject to the taxable minimum, would impro v e
the long-range actuarial balance by 0.80 percent; including employer-
provided private group pension and profit-sharing contributions in OASDI
taxable earnings, subject to the taxable maximum, would improve the long-
range actuarial balance by 0.37 percent. Together this would close 1.17 of
the imbalance—well over half (Advisory Council on Social Security 1997a,
231).
5.  The links between the growth of the labor force and the growth of produc-
tivity are quite complex. However, Pigeon and Wr a y ’s analysis shows that
those developed countries with the lowest labor force growth have consis-
tently enjoyed much higher growth rates for productivity. It is possible that
firms adapt to slow growth of the labor force by devoting more resources to
skill enhancement and to capital per worker. Policy may also be directed to
increasing labor productivity in the presence of a “labor shortage” created by
slow growth of the labor force.
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